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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to derive conditions under which either dictator-
ship or the rule of law are the equilibria of a post-constitutional game. It
thus contributes to positive constitutional economics, i.e., the research pro-
gram that is interested in explaining the emergence of constitutions and their
change over time. In our model, society is assumed to consist of two groups
one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence. Violence can
be used to produce (transactional) security as well as to exploit the weaker
group, which has a comparative advantage in producing a private good. Yet,
exploitation is limited: it increases the chances of a revolution and reduces
the incentives of the exploited group to produce the private good. The mo-
del identiﬁes the conditions under which the two groups will comply with a
social contract which consists of the exchange of high eﬀort in producing the
private good against provision of security. We also identify conditions under
which a social contract is cheap talk and exploitation occurs.
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21. Introduction
Many societies are governed by autocrats. Many other governments remain within the
conﬁnes of the rule of law. We observe that societies which have been governed by
autocrats are able to depose of them and install a government that does not make itself
better oﬀ by exploiting its citizens. But we also observe that governments who had
refrained from exploitation for a long time end up as autocrats. These observations and
developments all deal with de facto constitutions, i.e., with the capacities and restrictions
of governments as they factually apply and not as they are written down in solemn form
in the document usually called the constitution.
A comprehensive economic theory capable of explaining these changes is not available
yet. Public Choice is basically interested in explaining the working properties of political
systems assuming a given set of rules. Its explanatory focus is furthermore heavily tilted
toward explaining the working properties of democratic systems. The economic theory
of autocracy is still in its infancy1. The same holds for an economic theory2
• that identiﬁes the conditions under which autocracy is to be expected, and those
under which the rule of law will prevail,
• and that furthermore explains the transition from one form of government to the
other.
It is the aim of this paper to make a step toward such a theory. To do so, we make
use of non-cooperative game theory3. As in Buchanan (1975), we distinguish between
a constitutional and a post-constitutional stage. However, we do not assume the con-
stitutional stage to take place only once, followed by a sequence of post-constitutional
interaction. We rather assume a sequence of games, each of which consists of a consti-
tutional and a post-constitutional stage, and disregard the possibility of intertemporal
decisions such as supergame strategies.
As our focus is on the non-cooperative interaction in the post-constitutional stage, we
take the result of the negotiations during the constitutional stage as exogenously given.
The aim of the model is to show whether the parties have an incentive to comply with the
constitutional agreement. If the equilibrium in the post-constitutional stage is compatible
with this social contract, then, at least in the round under consideration, it will indeed
become eﬀective. If the parties have an incentive not to stick to their promises made
during the constitutional stage, then the social contract is nothing but cheap talk.
We assume society to consist of two groups of individuals, one of which has a comparative
advantage in producing security, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in
producing a private good4. A social contract between these two groups consists of the
1Tullock (1987) is one of the few monographs on the subject.
2Voigt (1999) is a ﬁrst sketch.
3See e.g. Cooter (forthcoming), who deals with constitutional issues drawing on game theory
4Following North (1981).
3promise of the weaker group to produce the private good at a high level, whereas the more
violent group promises not to demand more than the agreed upon share of this output
in exchange for providing security5. In a number of papers, Mancur Olson has dealt
with the incentives of groups who have a comparative advantage in the expropriation of
others6. He has shown that ”roving bandits” have an incentive to become stationary and
to protect the property of a given population if that increases saving and investment
and will enable the stationary bandits to get a higher sum total out of that group. Olson
also shows that the optimal rate of extortion - or tax - is lower still if it is determined
by majority decision. In this paper, we go beyond the Olson-approach in that we model
the strategic interaction between the two groups explicitly.
In this paper, the conditions under which diﬀerent types of equilibria can be predicted
are systematically speciﬁed7. This allows us to identify parameter changes which cause
transformations from one form of government to another. An empirical evaluation of
the parameter developments in order to test whether our predictions concerning consti-
tutional change conform with empirically observable change will have to await another
paper.
We proceed as follows:
• Section two delineates our positive approach toward constitutional economics from
the hitherto dominating normative one.
• Section three contains our model.
• Section four concludes the paper and reiterates some of the open questions.
5Schmidt-Trenz (1996, 27) distinguishes models in which the provision of the public good may face
the so called ”contribution problem” or the so called ”delegation problem”. We focus on a situation
where the contribution problem does not arise, since the more violent group simply can demand a
share of the private group. Furthermore, the delegation problem is explicitly ruled out in our model,
since the violent group is assumed to produce security anyway. Rather, we analyze whether the
violent group demands more than the agreed upojn share of the private good.
6E.g. Olson (1991), but also McGuire/Olson (1996).
7See also Grossman (forthcoming) who argues that a high survival probability of the state is a
precondition for the state to credibly commit itself to non-expropriation. In other words: The higher
the capability of the citizens to depose of their government, the lower the chances that government
will act as if it were an agent of the citizenry.
Concerning parliament as an organization that allows autocrats to credibly bind themselves, Barzel
(1997) argues that secure kings deliberately gave up some of their powers which enabled them
to credibly commit themselves to their promises not to conﬁscate the property of their subjects
which in turn made the realization of additional gains from cooperation possible. His approach thus
ﬂatly contradicts the more conventional one that conceptualizes the emergence of parliament as
the consequence of weak autocrats. Here, our focus is not so much on explaining the emergence of
institutions that enable actors to make the promises credible but to identify possible equilibria in
an essentially institution-free environment.
42. Normative versus Positive constitutional economics
Until recently, constitutional economics has almost exclusively been a normative ap-
proach. Although the most important representative of the program, James M. Bucha-
nan, denies this imbalance between legitimization and explanation8, he also admits that
”(t)he purpose of the contractarian exercise is not explanatory in this sense. It is, by
contrast, justiﬁcatory in that it oﬀers a basis for normative evaluation. Could the obser-
ved rules that constrain the activity of ordinary politics have emerged from agreement in
constitutional contract? To the extent that this question can be aﬃrmatively answered,
we have established a legitimating linkage between the individual and the state”9.
The legitimating link is thus based on unanimous consent. As long as it is factually
obtained, this might indeed be suﬃcient for legitimizing a constitution and subsequent
government action. But if the consent is merely hypothetical, i.e. imagined by some social
scientist or politician, a legitimating link can only be had if the preferences imputed
on the individuals who are to (hypothetically) agree unanimously are uniformly agreed
upon. If that is not the case, i.e., if there are quarrels concerning the ”correct” imputation
of preferences, diﬀerent observers will be able to legitimate very diﬀerent constitutions.
E.g., if subjects are assumed to be highly risk-averse, they would agree to constitutional
rules very diﬀerent from those they will agree to were they assumed to be risk-neutral. If
almost any constitution can be legitimated by somebody or the other, the legitimating
link will, obviously, be rather weak.
When constitutional economists try to make a positive argument concerning the emer-
gence of the state, they often draw on social contract theory. They usually model two
individuals who are stuck with the Nash-equilibrium of the prisoners’ dilemma. Because
both could be better oﬀ were they able to commit themselves to cooperate, they create
the state via social contract enabling them to mutually cooperate.
Suppose that indeed the state is founded by contract as a consequence of the inability
of two (or more) potential parties to a private contract to credibly renounce playing the
dominant strategy. This amounts to nothing more than the claim that the inability to
enter into a mutually beneﬁcial contract can be overcome by entering into yet another
contract. Suppose that this last contract was equally the attempt to coordinate beha-
vior in a prisoners’ dilemma. Obviously, one would need yet another contract to solve
the second-order dilemma and so forth. In other words: the attempt to solve a simple
prisoners’ dilemma by a social contract is equivalent to entering into an inﬁnite regress.
Whereas the argument just presented focuses on the emergence of constitutions, a similar
reproach can be made concerning their stability: suppose the two parties that originally
failed to credibly renounce their defect-strategies and consequently also failed to solve
the prisoners’ dilemma entered into a social contract and founded the state with the
intention of establishing an impartial arbitrator and an enforcement agency. The parties
to the simple exchange contract then disarmed themselves and paid a fee to the third
8E.g. Buchanan (1990, 2).
9(1987, 249).
5party for its services instead10. They endowed the third party with the monopoly of using
force. Then what incentives does the third party (the state) have to stick to its role of
impartial arbitrator instead of expropriating the two parties which originally founded
it?
We thus argue that in order to explain the emergence of the state, the notion of social
contract is of little help. Similarly, it is of little help when one is interested in explaining
constitutional change. If constitutional rules are assumed to be the most basic layer of
rules, they need to be self-enforcing. This does, however, not mean that the notion of
contract would become completely superﬂuous. Indeed, one can conceive of a give and
take between a limited number of actors.
It is crucial, however, not to introduce an enforcement agency by ﬁat but to analyze
whether the contracting parties have incentives to stick to the provisions of the contract
in the post-constitutional stage. In our model, we therefore only need two players, and
not a third one who is created by the original two players. As a consequence of the
folk-theorem11, proponents of social contract theory could argue that they can also do
without a third party as long as the game is repeated often enough. That is why we
decided not to focus on repeated games but to ask whether various forms of government
could also be explained by analyzing a one-shot game which might, however, be played
repeatedly, yet without assuming intertemporal links.
It might be useful to present the central questions of positive constitutional economics
since it is still a very young research program12: on a very basic level, one can distin-
guish between constitutional rules as explanantia on the one hand and constitutional
rules as explananda on the other. In the ﬁrst case, one assumes various constitutional
arrangements as given and asks whether they systematically cause variation in variables
of interest to the economist. One could, e.g., compare how rule of law constitutions fare
with regard to per capita income when compared to autocracies.
Modeling constitutions as explananda, one aims at explaining the emergence of con-
stitutions and their change over time. Natural candidates for explanatory variables are
the preferences that the relevant actors bring to the bargaining table (the constitutional
convention or what have you) as well as the procedures used for reaching a bargaining
solution. Here, we are, of course, interested in identifying some variables that determine
whether the resulting constitution is one of limited government and would therefore be
close to a rule of law constitution, or whether some level of exploitation prevails which
would correspond to autocracy.
10Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997) provide an analysis of the impact that court costs and imperfect
decision-making judges have on contracting parties in a trust game.
11See e.g. Fudenberg/Maskin (1986).
12Voigt (1997) is a survey.
63. The choice between dictatorship and cooperation
3.1 Basic assumptions
We assume society to consist of two groups of individuals, those who have a comparative
advantage in using violence and those who have a comparative advantage in producing
a private good. Each group consists of a large number of individuals who are treated
as homogeneous. We model both groups of individuals as if they were one monolithic
actor because we are interested in the analysis of intergroup interaction and not in
intragroup interaction. The group commanding the comparative advantage in violence
has the capacity to exploit the other group. But the diﬀerential in the capacity to produce
violence is not unlimited: the costs of overthrowing the exploiting group decrease in
exploitation13.
The actor commanding an advantage in producing violence has an interest that the other
actor works as hard as possible thus producing a high social product of which she would
like to secure a share as large as possible. The other actor has an interest in the ﬁrst
actor providing security against external aggression for a price as low as possible.
Drawing on a well-established notion of constitutional economics, we want to distinguish
between a constitutional and a post-constitutional stage. In the constitutional stage, the
two actors would (implicitly) negotiate on the price of the provision of security. In return,
the actor commanding an advantage in producing the private good would promise to
choose a certain (high) eﬀort level. We call this agreement a ”social contract”14.
It diﬀers from the usual notion of social contract in at least two aspects:
• no third party which could decide quarrels between the two contracting parties is
introduced. The necessity of self-enforceability thus becomes apparent.
• Secondly, the parties negotiating the constitutional agreement are perfectly aware
of their identities, thus know whether their comparative advantage is in producing
the private good or in producing violence.
The process by which the negotiating parties bring the contract about is not modeled at
all. Instead, we focus on the post-constitutional stage, asking what conditions have to be
fulﬁlled in order to make an agreement reached on the constitutional stage sustainable.
Coined diﬀerently: the scope that the bargaining parties have on the constitutional stage
is determined by backward induction focusing on the post-constitutional stage. The idea
that a simple sheet of paper could bind actors even against their own interest is thus
done away with.
Two results are of prime interest: the case in which both actors have incentives to
comply with the agreement reached during the ﬁrst stage. This is called cooperation.
13This approach is similar to the one in Henning/Lu (1999), who allow for a probability of a successful
revolution that is increasing in the tax rate.
14For such an approach to constitutional contracts, see Voigt (1999, chapter 6).
7The ﬁrst actor sticks to the agreed upon price for the provision of security, the second
actor displays a high level of eﬀort. The second result is the one in which the ﬁrst actor
extracts a price surpassing the one agreed upon. We call this equilibrium exploitation.
We assume that the higher the level of exploitation, the higher the costs that the ﬁrst
actor has to bear in order to execute the chosen level. We further assume that the second
actor can always try to depose of the current government (the ﬁrst actor). The costs
of starting such an attempt are assumed to be independent of the level of exploitation
chosen by the government. However, the probability of a successful revolution is assumed
to be increasing in the production of the private good.
3.2 The model
In this paper, we only model the post-constitutional stage. Hence, we take the agreement
upon the cooperative eﬀort level and the share of the private good for the more violent
group as exogenously given. The two players, called V and W, are assumed to be risk-
neutral. V is the group with the comparative advantage in violence. Thus, W has a
comparative advantage in producing the private good. The subsequent analysis shows
the conditions under which the agreement will be carried out, and under which conditions
it is cheap talk and exploitation occurs. In other words, the equilibrium results provide
the constraints for the preconstitutional negotiations that (implicitly) take place in each
round. This modeling strategy is thus closer to Binmore’s approach who conceptualizes
the ”game of life” as continuosly taking place in the state of nature15. This refutes the
notion of normative constitutional economics according to which the actors are able to
erect behavioral constraints in one constitutional stage that will eﬀectively channel their
behavior in all of the post-constitutional stages.
We model the post-constitutional stage as a one-shot game, see ﬁgure 1. W moves ﬁrst
and decides on the eﬀort level e, which can either be low or high: e ∈ {l;h}. The social
product is a function of the eﬀort level Y = Ye with Yl < Yh. The incremental costs W
has to bear if he chooses e = h are denoted as E.
After the input decision of W, his opponent V has to decide whether to demand only
the agreed upon share of the private good (qe = q0) or a higher share (qe > q0). We take
the level of the cooperative share as determined on the constitutional stage and thus as
exogenously given in the post-constitutional game under consideration. To demand less
than the cooperative share q0 is a dominated move; hence the choice situation of V at
his node can, for the moment, be described as qe = q0 versus qe ∈]q0,1]. qe,e ∈ {l;h}
denotes the diﬀerent reactions of V on W’s eﬀort choice. If V decides to exploit W at a
rate that exceeds q0, which is indicated by a triangle in ﬁgure 1, he has to bear costs,
denoted as k > 0. These costs are required to produce additional violence - if V chooses
to exploit W, he does not only have to protect the external borderlines of the economy,
but also has to invest resources into oppression.
If V has chosen exploitation, then W decides whether to attempt a revolution or not. If
15See Binmore (1994).
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the revolution is successful, which occurs with probability pe, then V becomes incapable
of demanding any of the social product. Whether the revolution is successful or not is
modelled as a chance move of ”Nature”, which is denoted as N. We assume ph > pl: The
more W has produced, the better are the odds when trying to overthrow V. In case of
failure (with probability 1−pe), W has to pay the share of the social product demanded
by V, namely qe. Successful or not, W has to bear revolution costs, denoted as c. For
technical reasons, we assume q0peYe < c < peYe for all e ∈ {h;l}.
9Figure 1 illustrates some of the driving forces of the model:
• Exploitation at a rate that exceeds the cooperative one (q0) has, at a ﬁrst glance,
a beneﬁcial impact on V’s payoﬀ. The same holds for a higher eﬀort of W.
• However, the additional exploitation costs k can make exploitation harmful for V.
• The same holds for higher eﬀort, which on the one hand makes exploitation more
beneﬁcial, yet on the other hand increases the probability of a successful revolution,
p.
Hence, high eﬀort of W is clearly beneﬁcial for V as long as he avoids a revolution - or
if V exploits at a rate that overcompensates for the risk of being overthrown. For the
moment we simply assume that W does not choose to try to depose of his opponent if V
only demands the cooperative share; the analysis below will show that this assumption
can also be derived as an endogenous result.
3.3 Backward induction
3.3.1 The revolution decision
First, we analyze W’s decision whether to attempt a revolution (option rev) or not. Note
that, when W has to make this decision, his eﬀort choice and hence the eﬀort costs are
already sunk. For the analysis whether it is better to attempt a revolution or not, we
thus can neglect the costs of high eﬀort, which are denoted as E. Moreover, we do not
regard which eﬀort W has chosen and present the subsequent analysis without specifying
e.
Given W has chosen his eﬀort level and V has chosen to exploit W (at a rate qe that
exceeds q0), then W receives
(1 − qe)Ye
if he adapts to the exploitation. The revolution, on the other hand, yields
pe[Ye − c] + (1 − pe)[(1 − qe)Ye − c]
for W. This equals peYe + (1 − qe)Ye − pe(1 − qe)Ye − c and
(1 − qe)Ye + peqeYe − c
Thus, this is W’s expected payoﬀ from attempting a revolution, which exceeds his payoﬀ
from adapting to exploitation if, and only if, the following condition holds:
10peqeYe > c
We call this expression the revolution condition. If the revolution condition does not
hold, i.e. if c ≥ peqeYe, then it is beneﬁcial for W not to attempt the revolution.









Figure 2 visualizes the revolution condition: The horizontal line represents the revolution
costs c, the diagonal line stands for qepeYe, the expected gain from revolution. The




To the left of this threshold, the revolution condition does not hold, hence (not) is the
preferred option. To the right of ˆ qe, revolution is beneﬁcial.
3.3.2 The exploitation decision
The analysis above showed that V triggers the subsequent behavior of W when deman-
ding his share of the social product. If he chooses qe < ˆ qe, then W will not attempt a
revolution16. Now it is obvious that after qe = q0 V does not have to fear a revolution.
If, however, V chooses qe > ˆ qe, then he faces the lottery of a revolution. His expected
payoﬀ then is (1 − pe)qeYh − k, because in case of a successful revolution, V receives no
share of the social product and still has to bear the additional costs of violence.
V now has to distinguish three cases:
16Again, in this section, we can neglect the incremental costs of high eﬀort, E.
11• If he chooses q0, his payoﬀ is q0Ye. This saves him the additional costs of k.
• If he wants to exploit W, but avoid a revolution, he has to choose qe ∈]q0, ˆ qe]. His
payoﬀ then is qeYe − k.
• If he accepts the risk of being overthrown, then he chooses qe ∈]ˆ qe,1] and receives
(1 − pe)qeYe − k as the expected payoﬀ.
Obviously, in all of the three cases, the (expected) payoﬀ of V is monotonically increasing
in qe. Hence, only three of his options are relevant for V:
a) qe = q0, i.e. to cooperate.
b) qe = ˆ qe, i.e. moderate exploitation that avoids revolution.
c) qe = 1; i.e. the maximum exploitation, facing the risk to get overthrown in the
following revolution.
Given an eﬀort choice e, the option q0 is optimal, if the payoﬀ q0Ye exceeds both ˆ qeYe−k
(from moderate exploitation) and (1 − pe)Ye − k (from the maximum exploitation with
revolution). Moderate exploitation, i.e. qe = ˆ qe, is optimal if ˆ ae−k exceeds both the payoﬀ
from cooperation (q0Ye) and from exploitation with revolution, which is (1 − pe)Ye − k.
Thus, we can derive the following
Proposition 1: Given a social contract (q0,h), an eﬀort choice e ∈ {h;l},
probabilities of success of a revolution ph > pl, revolution costs c with
q0peYe < c < peYe, then the optimal action of V is
• qe = q0 if, and only if, k > (ˆ qe − q0)Ye and k > (1 − pe − q0)Ye;
• qe = ˆ qe if, and only if, k < (ˆ qe − q0)Ye and ˆ qe > (1 − pe);
• qe = 1 if, and only if, k < (1 − pe − q0)Ye and ˆ qe < (1 − pe).
This proposition is visualized in ﬁgure 3. The graph shows combinations of the parame-
ters k and ˆ qe, which are exogenous17. Figure 3 shows, for all of the possible combinations
of k and ˆ q, V’s optimal reaction qe on the eﬀort chosen by W, with qe ∈ {q0; ˆ q;1}. Above
the horizontal dashed line, the condition k > (1 − pe − q0)Ye is fulﬁlled. To the right of
the vertical dashed line, ˆ qe > 1 − pe holds. The intersection of the dashed lines as well
as the origin of the graph (where k = 0 and ˆ qe = q0 hold) belong to k = (ˆ qe − q0)Ye.
Hence, above the diagonal line, k > (ˆ qe − q0)Ye holds.
The areas above and below the lines in ﬁgure 3 represent the parameter combinations
that allow to derive V’s optimal choice. E.g., in the lower left corner, there are two areas
where harsh exploitation (qe = 1) is optimal. To the right, but below the diagonal line,
qe = ˆ qe is the optimal choice. In the upper areas, qe = q0 is optimal. Note that the
boderlines between these areas are governed by
17ˆ qe is determined by c = qepeYe. pe and Ye are exogenous, hence ˆ q is exogenous, too.
12Figure 3: The exploitation conditions
-
6 k
ˆ qe 1 1 − pe q0
(1 − pe − q0)Ye
k = (ˆ qe − q0)Ye
qe = q0 qe = q0 qe = ˆ qe
qe = ˆ qe qe = 1 qe = 1
• The eﬀort e chosen by W,
• the exogenous parameters c,Ye,pe,k, and
• the result of the pre-constitutional agreement q0.
With a high k, only cooperation or moderate exploitation can be optimal for V, whereas
under a lower k, either maximum or moderate exploitation is optimal. Whether moderate
exploitation it the best choice depends on ˆ q.
3.3.3 The eﬀort decision
Our last step of the backward induction analysis is to derive the parameter settings for
the optimal eﬀort choice of W. Now the incremental costs of high eﬀort, denoted as
E, become relevant for the anaylsis. In this paper, we are not interested in a complete
equilibrium analysis. Our focus is to derive the conditions for stable cooperation (rule
of law) and stable exploitation. Hence, we only derive the conditions for the following
two equilibrium paths:
131. (e = h,qh = q0), i.e., compliance with the social contract.
2. (e = l,ql = ˆ ql,not), i.e., stable exploitation.
According to the proposition derived above, it depends on the paramters k,c,pe,Ye and
q0 whether q0, ˆ qe or 1 is the optimal reaction of V on a particular eﬀort choice. Since
W can choose his eﬀort level e out of {h;l}, there exist nine possible combinations of
optimal reactions qh and ql. For each of these nine cases, a condition can easily be derived
under which V prefers the high eﬀort.
For simpliﬁcation, we limit our view to one out of the nine possible cases, namely the one
where (ql = ˆ ql,qh = q0) reﬂects the optimal behavior of V. The necessary and suﬃcient
condition for this case is
k > (1 − ph − q0)Yh ∧ (1)
k > (ˆ qh − q0)Yh ∧ (2)
ˆ ql > 1 − pl ∧ (3)
k < (ˆ ql − q0)Yl (4)
The ﬁrst two of these conditions make q0 the optimal reply on e = h, whereas conditions
(3) and (4) provide that q0 is optimal in case of e = l. If the conditions (1) through (4)
hold, then W receives (1−q0)Yh−E if he chooses e = h. His expected payoﬀ from e = l
is, on the other hand, (1 − ˆ qe)Yl. Thus, he prefers high eﬀort over low if, and only if,
E < (1 − q0)Yh − (1 − ˆ ql)Yl (5)
This leads to our second proposition:
Proposition 2: Given a social contract (q0,h). If the conditions (1) through
(5) hold, the equilibrium path of the game is (e = h,qh = q0). If, on the other
hand, conditions (1) through (4), and not (5) hold, then the equlibrium path
is (e = l,ql = ˆ ql,not).
Note that this proposition states suﬃcient (but not necessary) conditions for the two
equilibrium paths that we analyze here. If either of the conditions (1) through (4) were
violated, this would have an impact on the payoﬀs W had to take into consideration
when making his eﬀort decision. This decision is governed by condition (5) if conditions
(1) through (4) hold.
3.4 The impact of parameter changes
In this section, we will systematically analyze the impact of changes of the parameters
Yh,Yl,ph,pl,c,k and E on the ﬁve conditions that were derived above. In doing so, the
social contract parameters (h,q0) are of special interest; recall that q0 = c/peYe.
14Let us begin with the conditions for qh = q0, namely (1) and (2). The conditions (1) and
(2) are more likely to be fulﬁlled,
• the higher k,ph,Yh and q0,
• and the lower c
If only condition (1) is violated, then it is obvious from ﬁgure 3 on page 13 that the
optimal answer on e = h is qh = 1. If only (2) does not hold, then the optimal qe would
be ˆ qh.
Things are less obvious with respect to the conditions (3) and (4). Condition (4) is
k < (ˆ ql − q0)Yl. Using ˆ qe = c/peYe leads to k < c/pl − q0Yl, which is easier to evaluate.
Condition (3) is equivalent to c/plYl > 1−pl, which can be transformed to c > (pl−p2
l)Yl.
Taking into account that pl ∈ [0,1], we can derive that the conditions (3) and (4) are
more likely to be fulﬁlled,
• the higher c,Yl and q0,
• and the lower pl
If only condition (3) is violated, V’s optimal answer on e = l would be ql = 1. The
violation of condition (4) alone would make ql = q0 optimal.
Finally, we analyze condition (5), which is equivalent to E < (1−q0)Yh−Yl +c/pl. This
condition is more likely to be fulﬁlled,
• the higher Yh and c,
• and the lower E,Yl,pl and q0.
With respect to the social contract parameters, these considerations lead to the following
results: In order to implement the equilibrium path (e = h,qh = q0), Yh should be as
high as possible. It is only the eﬀort condition that keeps the parties from contracting a
very high h. The share of the violent party, q0, on the other hand, must not be too high
(due to the eﬀort condition), and not too low (due to the exploitation condition).
The diﬀerence between Yh and Yl reﬂects the productivity of a particular eﬀort input E.
If this productivity is high, and the share to the violent group is somehow medium, then
a social contract is likely to be fulﬁlled. With a relatively high Yl (or a low productivity),
exploitation would occur - the social contract is only cheap talk.
4. Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we have derived the conditions which determine the various possible
equilibria concerning the eﬀort level chosen by W and the exploitation level chosen by
15V. Section 3.3 served to derive the equilibrium conditions via backward induction. We
were especially interested in two of the possible equilibria, namely the one equivalent to
compliance with the social contract and the other one equivalent to stable exploitation.
In section 3.4, the results derived in 3.3 were interpreted by asking what eﬀects changes
in the parameter settings would bring about.
Concerning the chances of a social contract consisting of a promise of W to exert a
high eﬀort level and of V to constrain taxation to a predetermined level to be enforced,
it was shown that self-enforceability increases with the payoﬀs of a given E, i.e. with
the productivity that additional eﬀort on the side of W entails. It seems worth noting
that this result obtains although we only analyze a one-shot game; it is thus not due
to intertemporal threats from W to produce less in the next period in case V does not
stick to the fair taxation level.
Similarly, it was shown that chances of self-enforceability increase with high exploitation
costs. This result is in accordance with our intuitions: the more costly it is for the group
producing violence to take away some of the wealth of the other group, the less attractive
this option becomes. Formulated the other way round: the more costly it becomes, the
more incentives this group has to stick to the implicitly agreed upon taxation level.
Finally, it was shown that chances of self-enforceability increase with low revolution
costs. This result is also in accordance with our intuitions: the less costly it is to kick oﬀ
a revolution, the more careful V will be not to renege upon the social contract implicitly
agreed upon with W.
It is, of course, tempting to think of an empirical test of this theory. Rather than carrying
it out here, some of the problems to be solved will simply be spelled out. To group
empirically observable cases into one of the possible equilibrium paths, one would have
to be able to agree on their speciﬁc situation. Going even one step further back, one
would look at the conditions one through ﬁve that were derived in 3.3 for a fair taxation
level to materialize. Unequivocally agreeing on when these conditions are fulﬁlled will
hardly ever be possible. One of the central insights of this theory is, however, that
high productivity increases the chances of self-enforceability. One test-strategy could
therefore consist in estimating the productivity of a given eﬀort-level at diﬀerent times
and diﬀerent places. This estimate could then be compared with income and taxation
levels of those societies. One could proceed similarly with exploitation and revolution
costs.
Confronting the insights of the model with empirically observable constitutional agree-
ments, a number of questions remain open. Apparently, it can be observed that consti-
tutional arrangements which - due to the speciﬁc parameter settings - do not have a
real chance of becoming enforced are still concluded and solemnly presented in public.
What are the incentives of the actors to invest time and eﬀort into negotiating these
documents if their ability to constrain politicians - and other actors - is rather small?
Deviating from the approach usually chosen in constitutional economics, we decided not
to model the constitutional stage explicitly but to identify the parameters which deter-
mine whether an agreement reached on the constitutional level is enforceable or not. For
16a sequel paper, endogenizing the bargaining process taking place on the constitutional
stage rather than assuming the contract as exogenously determined seems a logical step.
Closely related is another deviation from conventional constitutional economics that was
chosen here: we do away with the concept of a third party that would somehow enforce
social contracts but do insist on the self-enforceability of such contracts.
The particular novelty of our approach is that we also deviate from well-established con-
cepts of self-enforceability such as those of Telser (1980), Klein (1985), or Axelrod
(1984) which are based on repeated games. That is not to say that repetition will not
have any eﬀects - it almost certainly will. It could thus be an issue of a sequel paper
to deal with the intertemporal eﬀects that arise as a consequence of repetition. One
possible aspect is that W could invest in order to enhance is productivity which could
possibly lead to a change in the equilibrium path.
It seems worth noting that the analyses presented in 3.4 are concerned with comparative
statics which means that we do not deal with the origin of changes in our exogenous
variables. If one is interested in the path from one equilibrium to another, i.e. in a
dynamic model, this will certainly become an issue. This is, too, a possible topic of a
future paper.
In this paper, there are two homogenous actors V and W. In future papers, two modi-
ﬁcations would seem to be worthwhile: (1) to give up the assumption that the groups
are perfectly organized. In other words, one could introduce latent interest groups that
would have to overcome the free-rider problems inherent in collective action in the ﬁrst
instance. (2) to allow for a larger number of groups who make up a uniform W in our
model. This would bring the issue of coalition building among them to the fore.
Obviously, the research program of Positive Constitutional Economics is still in its very
beginning. Much theoretical and empirical work remains to be done in order to explain
the emergence and teh modiﬁcation of self-enforcing, i.e. de facto constitutions.
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